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THE POLITICS OF POSTMODERN JURISPRUDENCE
Stephen M. Feldman* For me the world has always been more of a puppet show. But when one looks behind the curtain and traces the strings upward he finds they ter minate in the hands of yet other puppets, themselves with their own strings which trace upward in tum, and so on. In my own life I saw these strings whose origins were endless enact the deaths of great men in vio lence and madness.1
-Cormac McCarthy
What is the politics of postmodern jurisprudence? Forms of postmodern interpretivism, including philosophical hermeneutics2 and deconstruction,3 assert that we are always and already interpreting. This assertion has provoked numerous scholarly attacks, many of which in voke standard modernist hobgoblins such as textual indeterminacy, sol ipsism, ethical relativism, and nihilism.4 From the modernist standpoint, postmodern jurisprudence thus is either conservative or apolitical be cause it lacks the firm foundations necessary for knowledge and cri tique. In this article, I argue that these modernist attacks not only are mistaken but that they also obscure the potentially radical political 4. For one recent attack on Derridean deconstruction as nihilistic and relativistic, see Martha C. Nussbaum, Skepticism About Practical Reason in Literature and the Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 714, 716, 724-25 (1994 95:166 dental Deconstruction, Transcendent Justice .1 Patterson directly assails postmodern interpretivism, which he refers to as "interpretive univer salism "8 and "hermeneutic holism."9 According to Patterson, we must reject interpretivism because it necessarily leads to an infinite regress of interpretations: interpretivism sends us reeling into an abyss where we can never grasp the meaning of a text because it constantly slips away into another interpretation, another meaning -and another, and an other, and another. In contrast to Patterson, Balkin identifies himself as a deconstructionist -a type of postmodern interpretivist -and in fact, Balkin's article can be read as an effort to respond to Patterson's con cerns. Balkin acknowledges and directly confronts the potential nihilism of deconstruction, and in doing so searches for a source of human val ues. Specifically, Balkin attempts to identify the source of the human desire or drive for justice. He concludes that "transcendent values," in cluding justice, arise from "the wellsprings of the human soul," which transcend "the creations of culture." 10 I shall argue that both Patterson and Balkin are wrong. Patterson mischaracterizes postmodern interpretivism. It does not lead to an infi nite regress of interpretations that undermines meaning, but rather, to the contrary, interpretivism explains how meaning and understanding are possible in the first place. We experience a meaningful being-in-the world because we are always and already interpreting. Meanwhile, Balkin errs by concluding that postmodern interpretivism, in the guise of deconstruction, needs to be augmented in order to explain the human desire for justice. Balkin underestimates the significant social and politi cal implications of deconstruction: deconstruction itself can explain how humans constantly quest after justice but never attain it. In short, the re ality of postmodern interpretivism -the way of our being-in-the-world -responds to both Patterson and Balkin. Interpretivism explains how we come to understand a text, and simultaneously, how we have an in exhaustible urge for justice.
Part I of this article describes and critiques Patterson's argument against postmodern interpretivism and explores the relation between un derstanding and interpretation. 11 In his article, Patterson focuses on 7. J.M. Balkin, Transcendental Deconstruction, Transcendent Justice, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1131 REv. (1994 8. See Patterson, supra note 6, at 3. 9. See Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/Feminism/Law, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 254, 314 (1992) [ How does one come to understand a legal text -or any other text, for that matter? Because Patterson believes postmodern interpretivism 12. Patterson, supra note 6, at 3. 13. Patterson views Dworkin and Fish as being "united at the deepest level of philosophical conviction." Id. at 6; see also Dennis Patterson, Conscience and the Con stitution, 93 CoLUM. L. REV. 270, 279-93 (1993) ( as a " second-order, reflective enterprise "31 that we engage in only if we fail to understand a text immediately because its meaning is ambiguous or otherwise unclear.32 Patterson argues:
The criterion for understanding an utterance is not engagement of a pro cess; rather, it is acting appropriately in response to the utterance. For ex ample, one evinces understanding of the request "Please pass the salt" by passing the salt or by explaining why it is impossible to do so. Under standing is made manifest in the act of passing the salt, and the act is a criterion for having understood the utterance. Understanding is acting properly in response to the request. If the request is vague or otherwise opaque, interpretation of the request may be necessary,. otherwise not.
[Thus] interpretation is best thought of as an activity we engage in when our understanding of an utterance is somehow in question (e.g., a request to pass the salt when the salt is directly in front of the person making the request). Interpretation is an activity of clarification -we take the utterance in question and appraise competing construals or inter pretations of it in an effort to clarify its meaning.33
In short, the very act of interpretation depends upon the practice of Gadamer maintains that an interpreter or reader is al ways situated in a communal " tradition "40 that inculcates the individual with prejudices and interests. Those prejudices and interests necessarily guide and limit understanding and communication. 41 That is, communal tradition and individual prejudices and interests constrain what one can possibly understand or see in a text. As Gadamer says, the traditions of one's community help to shape the interpreter's " horizon:" " the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point. "42 Furthermore, tradition is not a thing of the past.
38.
A text-analogue is any meaningful thing, event, or action that can be under stood or read as if it were a text See CLIFFORD GEERTZ. 1773, 1795 (1987) (contending that "already-in-place in terpretive constructs are a condition of consciousness").
42. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 2, at 302; see id. at 306.
Steven Connor writes:
In trying to understand our contemporary selves in the moment of the present, there are no safely-detached observation-posts, not in 'science', 'religion', or even in 'history'. We are in and of the moment that we are attempting to analyze, in and of the structures we employ to analyze it One might almost say that this terminal self-consciousness . . . is what characterizes our contemporary or 'postmodern' moment
Rather it is something in which we constantly participate. We are his torical beings who live in tradition, just as we live in a community : When we turn to a text, we anticipate or assume its completeness:
we assume that it can communicate some " unity of meaning. "49 Inter pretation thus requires us to con front the text as we search for its mean ing. The quest for meaning begins with our " fore-understanding " of the CONNOR, supra note 5, at 5. 43. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD, supra note 2, at 282. 44. Id. at 281. 45. Gadamer, The Universality, supra note 41, at 133.
A Wittgensteinian perspective echoes philosophical heaneneutics on this point. Gene Anne Smith writes:
[L]anguage is a practice, a technique, that we learn. It depends upon a given community of understanding and established practices, to be sure. But this is re quired not in order to verify my judgments. It is required to give the context in which I can make meaningful judgments at all. text -a fore-understanding generated from our prejudices and inter ests.50 This fore-understanding, however, is constantly adjusted as we question the text, as we penetrate further and further into its meaning;51
we are "ceaselessly fonning a new preunderstanding."52 Through an in teractive process consisting of understanding, questions, adjustments, further questions, and so forth, the u l timate meaning of the text dialecti cally "comes into being."53 In this sense, then, interpretation resembles a conversation or d ialogue between the interpreter and the text. Hence, while one anticipates or fore-understands a particular meaning for a text at the outset of interpretation, the dialogical process of hermeneutics can lead one to arrive eventually at a different meaning. Regardless, throughout this hermeneutic process, the interpreter continues to assume that the text is intelligible, that it has a unity of meaning, although in some instances an interpreter might finally conclude otherwise.
The metaphor of the hermeneutic circle elucidates the dialogical nature of interpretation. Gadamer first presents the hermeneutic circle in its simplest form: "It concerns the circular relation between the whole [of a text] and its parts: the anticipated meaning of a whole is under stood through the parts, but it is in light of the whole that the parts take on their illuminating func ti on."54 Gadamer, however, elaborates the her meneutic circle by accounting for the interrelations between interpreter, text, and tradition. According to Gadamer:
[The henneneutic circle] is not fonnal in nature. It is neither subjective nor objective, but describes understanding as the interplay of the move ment of tradition and the movement of the interpreter. The anticipation of meaning that governs our understanding of a text is not an act of subjec tivity, but proceeds from the commonality that binds us to the tradition. But this commonality is constantly being fanned in our relation to tradi tion. Tradition is not simply a pennanent precondition; rather, we pro duce it our5elves inasmuch as we understand, participate in the evolution of tradition, and hence further determine it ourselves. Thus the circle of understanding is not a "methodological" circle, but describes an element of the ontological structure of understanding Patterson insists that understanding and interpretation must be distin guished sharply, Gadamer maintains that the hermeneutic event is "one unified process. "57 To Gadamer, understanding, interpretation, and ap plication are not distinct events, but rather they constitute the compo nents of a unified hermeneutic act.58 We understand (or fore-understand) a text only insofar as we open to its meaning because of our prejudices derived from communal traditions; we develop prejudices only as we si multaneously accept and reconstruct -or interpret -communal tradi tions; and we understand and interpret texts as well as traditions only insofa r as we apply them to practical problems within our current hori zon. We cannot extract any one component of this hermeneutic process, such as understanding, and treat it as a primordial, uncontested, stable, or noncontingent starting point.59
Interpretation has two sides: on the one side, tradition limits the vision of the in terpreter as he or she approaches the text, yet on the other side, tradition does not exist unless people constantly create and recreate it through the interpretive pro cess itself. The latter side emphasizes that tradition is created as an ever new meaning of the text comes into being: as we participate in tradition by interpret ing texts, we transform and reconstitute that tradition. The two sides of interpre tation are not separate and do not function independently, rather they are simulta neous and interrelated. They resonate together as meaning comes into being within the hermeneutic circle.
Feldman, Republican Revival/Interpretive Turn, supra note 5, at 711-12 (footnotes omitted). -
65.

84.
56. See GADAMER. TRurH AND METHOD. supra note 2, at 462; see id. at 164-57. Id. at 308. 58. See id. at 307-08, 340-41; Feldman, New Metaphysics, supra note 5, at 683-
David Couzens Hoy writes:
[H]ermeneutics maintains that understanding is always already interpretation, suggesting thereby that understanding is always conditioned by the context in which it occurs. Similarly, understanding is always already application in the sense that the understanding not only arises from a contextual background but also focuses specific features of the context, highlighting some and thereby reconfiguring the context in the very act of reaching an understanding of the spe cific statute.
David Couzens Hoy, Intentions and the Law: Defending Hermeneutics, in LEGAL HER MENEUTICS: HISTORY. THEORY, AND PRACTICE, supra note 39, at 173, 174; see Fred Dallmayr, Hermeneutics and the Rule of Law, in LEGAL HERMENEUTICS: HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE, supra note 39, at 3, 13-15 (describing hermeneutics as a uni fied process).
[Vol. 95:166 Gadamer's notion of a unified hermeneutic act directly corresponds with his metaphysical stance. Contrary to Patterson's characterization of interpretivism, Gadamer explicitly rejects modernist metaphysics, which opposes an autonomous subject or interpreter against an objective text.
Thus, a text is not an object in a foundationalist sense -no uninter preted source of meaning stands outside of or prior to interpretation.60
Instead, no matter what we do, we are always and already interpreting.
In Gadamer's terms, hermeneutics is ontological.61 Our very being-in the-world is interpretive, and hence, we can never escape interpretation and understanding. Moreover, each interpretive encounter is itself onto logical. For example, Gadamer argues that when one views a picture, one does not approach it as a subject to an object; rather, the picture is an "ontological event"62 in which "being appears, meaningfully and visibly. "63 The hermeneutic act, then, is an ontological event in which meaning "comes into being."64 This ontological hermeneutics leaves no room for a disjointed hermeneutic act that would radically separate un derstanding and interpretation. Understanding, interpretation, and appli cation must remain conceptually and sociologically united to maintain the ontological quality of hermeneutics. That is, understanding, interpre tation, and application all are necessary components of the ontological event in which meaning comes into being.6 5
This vision of a unified hermeneutic act is of paramount impor tance in responding to Patterson's major criticisms of postmodern inter pretivism. Basically, Patterson articulates two related charges. First, he claims that understanding must be distinguished from interpretation: un derstanding is primary and prereflective, while interpretation is secon dary and reflective. Second, he claims that if understanding and inter pretation are not sharply differentiated -if understanding is construed as a type of interpretation -then we fall into an infinite regress of in-60. As Fish claims: [T] here is no such thing as literal meaning, if by literal meaning one means a meaning that is perspicuous no matter what the context and no matter what is in the speaker's or hearer's mind, a meaning that because it is prior to interpretation can serve as a constraint on interpretation. 
65.
In discussing the aesthetic experience of art, Gadamer notes: "Understanding must be conceived as a part of the event in which meaning occurs, the event in which the meaning of all statements ... is formed and actualized. " Id. at 164-65.
terpretations that dooms us to solipsistic relativism. In response to the first charge, if the hermeneutic act is a unity, as Gadamer maintains, then understanding and interpretation cannot be sharply separated.
Neither understanding nor interpretation stands prior to the other, but instead they resonate in a reciprocal, dialectical relationship. In a sense, then, understanding is merely a momentary pause in interpretation. Un derstanding is a moment when the interpreter senses, at least tempora rily, that she has arrived at the meaning of the text. Yet, simultaneously, the whole point or purpose of interpretation is to reach understanding; consequently, to talk of interpretation as independent of understanding is nonsensical. Understanding is always interpretive, but interpretation is nothing but the movement of understanding. 66
What does it mean, though, to assert that understanding is always interpretive? To Gadamer, it means nothing more than that we always open to and reach understanding only because of and through our prejudices and interests, which are derived from our communal tradi tions. Even understanding that is prereflective necessarily arises only because of our traditions and prejudices. In other words, even when one does not deliberate consciously about the meaning of the text, but rather appears to grasp its meaning immediately, that immediate grasp is pos sible only because the individual is situated within a horizon constituted by traditions and prejudices. In Stanley Fish's words: "A meaning that seems to leap off the page, propelled by its own self-sufficiency, is a meaning that flows from interpretive assumptions so deeply embedded that they have become invisible. "67 Furthermore, communal traditions neither are fixed, precisely bounded entities, nor are they passed on to individuals through some precise method or mechanical process. Balkin provocatively suggests that traditions are akin to "cultural software" insofar as they "become part of us and shape the way that we perceive the legal and social world. "68 Nonetheless, traditions differ from computer software pro-
In a related vein, Hayden White writes:
Understanding is a process of rendering the unfamiliar ... familiar; of removing it from the domain of things felt to be "exotic" and unclassified into one or an other domain of experience encoded adequately enough to be felt to be humanly useful, nonthreatening, or simply known by association. This process of under standing can only be tropological in nature, for what is involved in the rendering of the unfamiliar into the familiar is a troping that is generally figurative. 70. In a related vein , Anthony Giddens writes: "[T]ransient encounters of daily life cannot be conceptually separated from the long-term development of institutions. The most casual exchange of words involves the speakers in the long-term history of the language via which their words are formed, and simultaneously in the continuing re production of that language. ,, ANTHON Y GIDDENS, PROFILES AND CRITIQUES IN SO CIAL THEORY 11 (1982 [O]ur acts of language are actions in the world, not just in our minds. Even when we think we are simply communicating information, or being rigorously and ex clusively intellectual, or just talking, we are in fact engaged in performances, in relation to others, that are ethical and political in character and that can be judged as such.
JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION ix (1990). the child; the child mi g ht see his or her parents or other individuals in teract with physici a ns; the child mi g ht hear different people discuss doctors; and the child mi g ht read books or watch movies or television sho ws that po rtr ay physicians. Over time, the child thus acquires the meanin g of bein g a doctor throu g h the accumulation of these exper iences, althou g h the meanin g is a l ways mediated th rou g h lan g ua g e.
That is, these social experiences g a in meanin g ful shape only th rou g h lin g uistic concepts already existin g in th e community . Thus, the child eventually learns that a doctor talks in a particular manner, performs certain tasks, and wears a certain typ e of clo t hin g . The child, in effect, c arr ies these ch a racteristics as prejudices th at shape the child's concep tion or fore-understandin g of the role of physicians in the community.
The child does not acquire these prejudices in some ideal world of ab stractions; instead, the child concretely experiences doctors and repre sentations or portray a l s of them.76
At this point, it is worth notin g that my ar g ument mer g es close to P atterson's ar g ument. Patterson a r g u es that underst a ndin g , as a practice or practical activity , provides the foo ti ng th at prevents us from slidin g into a n infinit e interpretive re gr ess. I no w a r g u e that postmodern inter pretivism does not send us slidin g into an in fi nite interpre t ive re g ress because th e uni fi ed hermeneutic act includes the practical component of application.
In fact, the similarity bet ween our a r g u ments on this point su gg es ts that, perhaps, the differences bet ween our entire positions a r e less than at fi rst appeared. Maybe the distinction bet ween P atterson's Witt g ensteinian pra g matism and my postmodern interpretivism is the proverbial distinction wi t hout a difference.77 Aft er all, we bo t h reject hermeneutic foundationalism, an d we both emphasize prere fl ective co g nition. Maybe, then, th e disa g reement is no more th an a dispute over sem a ntics. P atterson re fe rs, fi rst, to understandin g as prereflective co g nitive activity and, second, to interpre t ation as deliberate reflection on the meanin g of a text. I re fe r to all co g ni t ive activities, whe t her re fl ec tive or prere fl ective, as hermeneutic acts th at include an interpretive component. In fact, I believe that with a bit of tinkering, we might get our defi nitions to match, and our disagreement would dissolve -almost. There is an additional problem. Our disagreement about terminology manifests a sharp political difference between us. Patterson attacks postmodern in terpretivism for textual indeterminacy, solipsistic relativism, and ulti mately, political conservatism. In fact, many others also have charged Gadamer with conservatism for too readily accepting the authority of tradition and the conventional meaning of the text.78 Ironically, how ever, this charge of political conservatism applies more accurately to Patterson than to Gadamer. Patterson's concept of understanding em bodies an uncritical acceptance of the normal or conventional. To Patterson, understanding arises from "conventional meanings"79 and is expressed by acting "properly"80 or "appropriately"81 in response to an utterance or request; acting improperly apparently indicates misunder standing, not resistance or criticism. Indeed, most tellingly, the crux of Patterson's argument seems to be that postmodern interpretivism goes wrong because it requires us (at least in his opinion) to use the terms "understanding" and "interpretation" in unconventional or unusual ways.82 According to Patterson's Wittgensteinian pragmatism, the mere fact that we ordinarily use words in a particular manner invests that us age with some normative priority or a presumption of rightness. 871, 874, 892, 957 (1989) .
79. Patterson states that we engage in interpretation only "when conventional meanings are called into question.
[Therefore] interpretation is dependent upon conven tional understanding and practice." Patterson, supra note 6, at 54-55 (emphasis added). 80. Id. at 21. 81. Id. at 20. 82. For example, Patterson claims that interpretive universalism is "born of a lack of attention to some obvious fe atures of ordinary understanding." Id. at 3. He contin ues: "[T]his [interpretive] account of the nature of legal understanding is profoundly misleading. It turns the ordinary into the mysterious, and it fails to account for the fact that understanding and interpretation are distinct activities." Id. at 7. 83. For example, Richard Shusterman insists that we must distinguish understand ing as prereflective cognition from interpretation as reflective activity in order to defend the ordinary use of the word understanding. See Shusterman, supra note 29, at 195-99. He writes that "interpretation standardly implies some deliberate or at least conscious thinking, while understanding does not." Id. at 190.
84. See generally RICHARD TARNAS. THE PASSION OF THE WESTERN MIND 26-35 (1991) (comparing the Sophists, as skeptical pragmatists, with Socrates). [Vol. 95:166 ingly, when Patterson muses about "the task of jurisprudence, "85 he in sists that it is largely descriptive, not critical: "The task of jurispru dence is the accurate description of the forms of argument used by lawyers to show the truth of propositions of law. "86 That is, jurispru dence should describe how lawyers use words in the practice of law. In short, Patterson's fear of relativism and nihilism induces him to retreat toward a Burkean acceptance of tradition and conventions.87
Whereas Patterson seems truly conservative, Gadamer is poten tially radical in two ways. First, Gadamer insists that the interpreter must risk her prejudices by opening up to the meaning of the text.
Gadamer refuses to endorse a hermeneutic vision in which an inter preter blithely imposes her preferred meaning on the text. Rather, the hermeneutic act should be a conversational or dialogical exchange be tween the interpreter and text. Through this hermeneutic act, the inter preter changes as meaning comes into being. Second, Gadamer 's philo sophical hermeneutics contains a potential deconstructive component.
While Gadamer emphasizes the anticipation of a complete and unified textual meaning, his approach also implicitly contains the seeds for a deconstructive attack on the conservative acceptance of textual mean ing.88 To develop this second point, I will now turn to Derridean decon struction and Balkin's argument concerning justice.
85. Patterson, supra note 6, at 56. 86. Id. Patterson continues by arguing: Jurisprudence should tum its attention away from the fixation on interpretation and study the ways in which lawyers go about the task of justifying propositions of law. Finally, we must continue to pay attention to the ways in which the mean ing of law is called into question and rival interpretations adjudicated.
Id. (footnote omitted). Even here, where Patterson hints at a more critical purpose for jurisprudence, he casts it in a largely descriptive manner. He does not recommend intervening or participating in the questioning of the meaning of law, but rather he sug gests that we "pay attention" to the ways in which such questioning ordinarily occurs. It is not until the very last sentence of the article that Patterson finally suggests a stronger critical stance when he writes: "[T]he central task of jurisprudence is the per spicuous description and critical appraisal of our practices of legal justification." Id.
87. Cf. George A. Martinez, The New Wittgensteinians and the End of Jurispru dence, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 545, 549, 558-65 (1996) (arguing that to later Wittgen stein and his followers, philosophy should be purely descriptive of ordinary language; therefore, critics have charged that this ordinary language type of approach to philoso phy fails to seek to critique and reconstruct language); see also Wm ter, supra note 15, at 1867. 88. Cf. Gerald L. Bruns, Law and Language: A Hermeneutics of the Legal Text, in LEGAL HERMENEUTICS: HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE supra note 39, at 23, 26 (arguing that Gadamer can be interpreted as reac tionary or radical).
II. ON P OSTMODERN lNTE RPRETIVISM AND J USTICE
A. The R elation Between Philosophical Hermeneutics and Deconstruction
As a manifestation of postmodern interpretivism, Derridean decon struction shares much in common with philosophical hermeneutics. 89
No less so than hermeneutics, deconstruction can be understood � an attempt to identify the irreducible conditions of human understanding.90
Both Gadamer and Derrida explore how we come to understand texts despite rejecting the foundationalist metaphysics of modemism.91 In Derridean terms, meaning is never grounded on a stable signified; rather, there "is always already" a play of signifiers.92 Derrida states:
From the moment that there is meaning there are nothing but signs. We think only in signs. Which amounts to ruining the notion of the sign ..... One could call play the absence of the tra nscendental signified as limit lessness of play, that is to say as the destruction of ... the metaphysics of presence. 93 • Hence, deconstruction echoes the central ontological tenet of her meneutics that we are always and already interpreting. As Derrida says, 89. Many critics of deconstruction mistakenly assume that it "encourages the idea of criticism as a kind of free-for-all hermeneutic romp, an activity where no constraints apply save those brought to bear by some arbitrary set of interpretative codes and con ventions." NORRIS, supra note 5, at 137. I agree with Norris, Balkin, Staten, and others who argue that this characterization of deconstruction presents only one (distorted) man ifestation of it; Derrida does not subscribe to this type of "sophistical freeplay." Id. at 151; see id. at 49-53, 140; HENRY STATEN, WITT GENSTEIN AND DERRIDA (1984); Balkin , supra note 7, at 1152. 90. See supra text accompanying note 39; cf. Diane Michelfelder & Richard Palmer, Introduction to DIALOGUE AND DECONSTRUCTION, supra note 18, at 1, 7-9 (noting that it can be argued that Derrida is the supreme hermeneutician of the twentieth century, and Gadamer the ultimate deconstructionist).
The relation between Derrida and Wittgenstein is, of cours e , problematic.
Compare STATEN, supra note 89, at 1, 64-108 (claiming that the later Wittgenstein achieves a consistent deconstructionist standpoint, in the Derridian sense) with NEWfON GARVER & SEUNG-CHONG LEE, DERRIDA AND WITT GENSTEIN (1994) (arguing that though Wittgenstein and Derrida share similarities, Wittgenstein presents the stronger position considering their significant differences).
92.
Derrida writes that "the signified is originarily and essentially (and not only for a finite and created spirit) trace, that it is always already in the position of the signi fier. " DERRIDA, GRAMMATO LOGY, supra note 3, at 73; see id. at 47, 50; see also JAMESON, supra note 5, at 96. Derrida and Gadamer use the term "play" in different ways. See Fred Dallmayr, Hermeneutics and Deconstruction: Gadamer and De"ida in Dialogue, in DIALOGUE AND DECONSTRUCTION, supra note 78, at 75, 82; Neal Ox enhandler, The Man with Shoes of Wind: The De"ida-Gadamer Encounter, in DIA LOGUE AND DECONSTRUCTION, supra note 78, at 265, 266.
93. DERRID A, GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 3, at 50; see DERRID A, PosmoNS, supra note 3, at 20.
there is no foundation for the "coming into being" of signs.94 The con tinual play or coming into being of signs or signifiers relates to Der rida's central concept of differance.
[T]he signified concept is never present in and of itself, in a sufficient presence that would refer only to itself. Essentially and lawfully, every concept is inscribed in a chain or in a system within which it refers to the other, to other concepts, by means of the systematic play of differences.
Such a play, differance, is thus no longer simply a concept, but rather the possibility of conceptuality, of a conceptual process and system in gen eral. For the same reason, differance, which is not a concept, is not sim ply a word, that is, what is generally represented as the calm, present, and self-referential unity of concept and phonic material.95
Just as Gadamer emphasizes that our prejudices arise from com munal traditions, Derrida argues that we always borrow concepts "from the text of a heritage. "96 We can never escape our heritage or, in Gadamerian terms, step outside of our horizon. According to Derrida, we are limited to "givens belonging to the discourse of our time,"97 and hence, even "deconstruction always in a certain way falls prey to its own work. "98 That is, deconstruction always necessarily uses and rein scribes the metaphysics and linguistic structures that it seeks to decon struct.99 Moreover, to Derrida, as well as to Gadamer, the givens of our 94. DERRIDA, GRAMMA TOLOGY, supra note 3, at 48. 95. DERRIDA, Differance, supra note 3, at 11. Derrida further states:
The play of differences supposes, in effect, syntheses and referrals which forbid at any moment, or in any sense, that a simple element be present in and of itself, referring only to itself. Whether in the order of spoken or written discourse, no element can function as a sign without referring to another element which itself is not simply present. This interweaving results in each "element" .•. being con stituted on the basis of the trace within it of the other elements of the chain or system. This interweaving, this textile, is the text produced only in the transfor mation of another text. Nothing, neither among the elements nor within the sys tem, is anywhere ever simply present or absent. There are only, everywhere, dif ferences and traces of traces .•..
. . . Differance is the systematic play of differences, of the traces of differ ences, of the spacing by means of which elements are related to each other. This spacing is the simultaneously active and passive (the a of differance indicates this indecision as concerns activity and passivity, that which cannot be governed by or distributed between the terms of this opposition) production of the intervals without which the "full" terms would not signify, would not function.
DERRIDA, PosmoNs, supra note 3, at 26-27. 96. DERRIDA, Structure, supra note 3, at 285. 97. DERRIDA, GRAMMA TOLOGY, supra note 3, at 70. 98. Id. at 24. 99. Derrida describes this process as follows:
[A]ll these destructive discourses and all their analogues are trapped in a kind of circle. This circle is unique. It describes the form of the relation between the his tory of metaphysics and the destruction of the history of metaphysics. There is no heritage -our communal traditions -neither are fixed and precisely bounded entities nor are they passed on to individuals through some precise method or mechanical process.100
If philosophical hermeneutics and deconstruction share so much in sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order to shake metaphys ics. We have no language -no syntax and no lexicon -which is foreign to this history; we can pronounce not a single destructive proposition which has not al ready had to slip into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of pre cisely what it seeks to contest DERRIDA, Structure, supra note 3, at 280-81.
100. See BAUMAN, INTIMATIONS, supra note 5, at 23. . 101. In more mundane terms, if Gadamer and Derrida were looking at a glass of water, Gadamer probably would say it is half full, while Derrida likely would say it is half empty.
102. WEINSHEIMER, supra note 2, at 9; see id. at 200 (noting that the truth of a text exceeds each understanding); cf. BAUMAN, INTIMATIONS, supra note 5, at 31 (stating that postmodern culture "is characterized by the overabundance of meanings").
103. See MADISON, supra note 3, at 115; Hoy, supra note 3, at 54. 104. See GADAMER, TRUTH AND MErnoo, supra note 2, at 293-94. 105. See MADISON, supra note 3, at 113-14 (observing that Gadamer's emphasis on application separates hermeneutics from deconstruction). o: what one can possibly perceive or understand.106 Furthermore, Gadamer emphasizes that because we are historical beings who live in tradition, just as we live in a community, tradition is something in which we constantly participate. Thus, we constantly constitute and re constitute our tradition, our culture, and our community as we engage Thus, Gadamer's articulation of philosophical hermeneutics con tains deconstructive potential, yet he fails to pursue it.110 Here, then, is 106. See STANLEY FISH, Critical Self-Consciousness, or Can We Know What We're Doing?, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALL Y 436, 450-55 (1989 109. See Feldman, The Persistence of Power, supra note 5, at 2262-66; Feldman, Republican Revival/Interpretive Turn, supra note 5, at 705-3 1; cf. James Risser, The Tw o Faces of Socrates: Gadamer/Derrida, in DIALOGUE AND DECONSTRUCTION, supra note 78, at 176, 179-83 (suggesting that Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics has deconstructive potential).
110. Gadamer's grasp of the deconstructive potential of philosophical hermeneu tics emerges most clearly in his criticism of Habermas's ideal speech situation. See Feldman, The Persistence of Power, supra note 5, at 2258-66; Hoy, supra note 3, at 61- Because Derrida concerns himself with the disempowering and de structive quality of the hermeneutic situation, he cares little about de ciding among the many potential meanings or truths of a text. Dis empowerment, quite simply, is not about making decisions; rather, it is about lacking the power to decide. Derrida is not interested in the prac tical component of the hermeneutic act since he does not seek to pursue or reconstruct a unified meaning for the text. To the contrary, Derrida seeks to find and highlight the trace of the Other that always hides in the margins of our understanding. Derrida seeks to uncover the violence that necessarily exists when we understand a text -the violence that is inevitably obscured in the practical quest for a usable and therefore uni fied meaning. To Derrida, violence manifests itself in the hermeneutic definition, exclusion, denial, and oppression of the Other -a con cealed outsider -and stands as an irreducible condition (or limit) of 62. However, John Brenkman argues that Gadamer does not sufficiently recognize the distortive power of tradition; rather, he accepts tradition as authoritative. See JOHN BRENKMAN, CuLTURE AND DOMINATION 30-38 (1987) ; cf. WARNKE, supra note 2, at 91, 99 (questioning whether Gadamer conservatively accepts tradition).
111. I do not mean to suggest that the total value or quantity of power always re mains the same through all social and hermeneutic events. Rather, I suggest that every hermeneutic event is both constructive and destructive, though any particular event may be more one than the other. Cf. Feldman, The Persistence of Power, supra note 5, at 2282-88 (noting that not all traditions and communities are equally distortive and exclusive).
112. Caputo, supra note 78, at 263. 113. Derrida states: The trace, where the relationship with the other is marked, articulates its possibil ity in the entire field of the entity ... which metaphysics has defined as the be ing-present starting from the occulted movement of the trace. The trace must be thought before the entity. But the movement of the trace is necessarily occulted, it produces itself as self-occultation. When the other announces itself as such, it presents itself in the dissimulation of itself .... The field of the entity, before be ing determined as the field of presence, is structured according to the diverse possibilities -genetic and structural -of the trace. The presentation of the other as such, that is to say the dissimulation of its "as such," has always already begun and no structure of the entity escapes it. DERRIDA. GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 3, at 47.
Norris places Derrida in the Kantian tradition insofar as Derrida seeks to identify the irreducible conditions of human understanding. But, as Norris points out, Derrida uses the Kantian transcendental method in an unusual way: "[Derrida has a] very differ ent way of posing the transcendental question: namely, by asking what conditions of imp ossibility mark out the limits of Kantian conceptual critique." NORRIS, supra note 5, at 200. That is, Derrida can be understood as asking what are the conditions that must be denied or oppressed to render understanding possible.
114. DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLOGY, supra note 3, at 62. 115. For example, when Derrida deconstructs the privileging of speech over writ ing, he states that writing will always "be the outside." Id. at 31. In other words, writ ing, which is in this case the Other or the supplement, is not just on the outside, but rather it is the outside. See also DERRIDA, Plato, supra note 3 (deconstructing Plato's Phaedrus, which focuses on the importance of speech over writing).
116. Cf. STEPHEN K. WHITE, POLmCAL THEORY AND POSTMODERNISM 16 (1991) (recognizing that deconstruction is political because it often exposes power where reason alone previously appeared).
Derrida: "Yes, but what legitimates tradition? Tradition arises
partly through violence and deception."
Gadamer: "Your desire for legitimacy merely reenacts modernist metaphysics. What do you want? A stable foundation? "
Derrida: "You are right. But you make exactly the point I am try ing to stress. There is no legitimating ground for meaning other than tradition, but there is, in turn, no legitimating ground for tradition itself.
Tradition is neither completely legitimate nor illegitimate.1 1 7 Under standing, therefore, necessarily is based on blindness and hypocrisy as we ignore and deny the violence and deception within tradition." 118 Gadamer: "Yes, but that's exactly the point. We do communicate.
We do understand. These are practical activities that necessarily con tinue without legitimating foundations." Derrida: "Yes, but the violence, the oppression, the denial .... "
And so on. To Gadamer, this debate is inexhaustible. A new per spective constantly comes into being as our horizons shift, but nonethe less we continue along in our pra�atic fashion -communicating, un derstanding, and interpreting. To Derrida, this tension between philosophical hermeneutics and deconstruction is undecidable. We are caught in a never-ending dialectic between the necessity and inade quacy of our linguistic forms. Both Derrida and Gadamer might agree, however, that we do not need to choose between hermeneutics and deconstruction. In fact, a choice does not even make sense: 1 1 9 philo sophical hermeneutics and deconstruction represent different planes or 117. In writing about law and justice, Derrida observes:
Since the origin of authority, the foundation or ground, the position of the law can't by definition rest on anything but themselves, they are themselves a vi olence without ground. Which is not to say that they are in themselves unjust, in the sense of "illegal." They are neither legal nor illegal in their founding moment. Derrida, Law, supra note 3, at 943.
118. See NORRIS, supra note 3, at 197-98. 119. For example, Derrida suggests that he, like everybody else, engages in the practical activity of interpretation when he acknowledges that he always is "analyzing, judging, evaluating this or that discourse." Jacques Derrida, Like the Sound of the Sea Deep Within a Shell: Paul de Man's War, 14 CRITICAL INQUIRY 590, 631 (Peggy Kamuf trans., 1988) [hereinafter Derrida, Sound of the Sea]; cf DERRIDA, Structure, supra note 3, at 292-93 (stating that two forms of interpretation are "absolutely irrecon cilable," so there is no "question of choosing"). Gadamer maintains that hermeneutics and deconstruction both try to continue Heidegger's effort to overcome metaphysics, though they do so along different paths. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Destruktion and Deconstruction, in DIALOGUE AND DECONSTRUCTION, supra note 78, at 102, 109; see also Fred Dallmayr, Self and Other: Gadamer and the Hermeneutics of Difference, 5 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 507, 515-16 (1993) (observing that to Gadamer, deconstruction contains insights that are germane to hermeneutics). [Vol. 95:166 axes in postmodern interpretivism. They both help us to comprehend the hermeneutic act, or how we come to understand a text (legal or oth erwise). Philosophical hermeneutics and deconstruction thus comple ment each other in that hermeneutics illuminates the affirm ative coming into being of meaning, while deconstruction stresses the limits of com munication and understanding. 1 20 This recognition takes us to Balkin and his discussion of deconstruction and justice.
B. Postmodern Ve rtigo
In 1990, Derrida published Force of Law: Th e "Mystical Founda tion of Authority. " 1 2 1 At that time, Derrida noted that although decon struction often had app eared not to address the problem of justice, deconstruction had "done nothing but address [justice], if only ob liquely, unable to do so directly." 1 22 In Force of Law, however, Derrida focused on the relation between deconstruction and justice by exploring how the violence (or force) of law often is deemed just or legitimate.123
Derrida concluded that a " 'mystical' limit" appears at the origin of law as law claims to rest on ultimately ungrounded authority.124 Justice itself, according to Derrida, is always displaced; it is never fully exper ienced. Justice is an "infinite demand: " 125 we constantly desire justice, but fulfillment of our desire always remains just beyond our reach. 1 26 120. Using Balkin's terms, I might argue that philosophical hermeneutics and deconstruction exist in a "nested opposition." As Balkin describes this state:
To deconstruct a conceptual opposition is to show that the conceptual opposition is a nested opposition -in other words, that the two concepts bear relations of mutual dependence as well as mutual differentiation. For example, we might dis cover that they have elements in common, which become salient in some con texts, but that in other contexts we note very important differences between them, so that they are not the same in all respects. In fact, we would note that the meaning of each depends in part on our ability to distinguish it from the other in some contexts. Balkin, supra note 7, at 1153. 121. Derrida, Law, supra note 3. 122. Id. at 935. Derrida adds that deconstructionists seek to intervene and change the polis and social world, not through strategic and controlled intervention, but "in the sense of maximum intensification of a transformation in progress." Id. at 931-33.
123. Derrida asked the following question: what is the difference between, on the one hand, the force of law that is just or, at least, is deemed legitimate, and on the other hand, force or violence that is unjust? See id. at 927.
124. Id. at 943. 125. Id. at 955. 126. Derrida states: [T] here is no justice without this experience, however impossible it may be, of aporia. Justice is an experience of the impossible. A will, a desire, a demand for justice whose structure wouldn't be an experience of aporia would have no chance to be what it is, namely, a call for justice. Every time that something Balkin's article, Tr anscendental Deconstruction, Tr anscendent Jus tice, 1 2 1 reacts to Derrida by, in effect, asking why we constantly desire justice when we seem forever unable to reach it. How do we, in other words, explain the infinite demand for justice? 1 28 Balkin's article, by trying to explain this infinite demand, can be read not only as a re sponse to Derrida, but also, in part, as a response to Patterson's charge that postmodern interpretivism is relativistic, solipsistic, and undermines social critique. 1 29 Balkin declares unequivocally that deconstruction "is decidedly not nihilistic." 1 30 I agree with this sentiment and with many of Balkin's other pronouncements regarding deconstruction and justice.
For example, I concur with Balkin when he says:
The deconstructor critiques for the purpose of betterment; she seeks out unjust or inappropriate conceptual hierarchies in order to assert a better ordering. Hence, her argument is always premised on the' possibility of an alternative to existing norms that is not simply different, but also more just, even if the results of this deconstruction are imperfect and subject to further deconstruction. Such a deconstruction assumes that it is possible to speak meaningfully of the more or the less just; it decidedly rejects the claim that nothing is more just than anything else, or that all things are equally just.131
Nonetheless, I strongly disagree with Balkin's ultimate conclusions regarding deconstruction and justice. He seemingly has experienced postmodern vertigo: an avowed postmodernist, he looked in the mirror, and saw another mirror, and another, and another. Suddenly, he felt sick, as if he were spinning out of control. So, instinctively, he reached down and grabbed for a piece of firm, modernist ground. Balkin insists comes to pass or turns out well, every time that we placidly apply a good rule to a particular case, to a correctly subsumed example, according to a determinant judgment, we can be sure that law (droit) may find itself accounted for, but cer tainly not justice. Law (droit) is not justice. Law is the element of calculation, and it is just that there be law, but justice is incalculable, it requires us to calcu late with the incalculable; and aporetic experiences are the experiences, as im probable as they are necessary, of justice, that is to say of moments in which the decision between just and unjust is never insured by a rule. Balkin elsewhere refers to justice as one of "those indeterminate values or urges located in the human soul, which human beings articulate through positive moral ity and cultural conventions, and which nevertheless always escape this articulation." Id. at 1139 . 136. See, e.g., id. at 1141 , 1155 . As Balkin observes: [H]uman cultural creations will always fail to be perfectly just, but not because they are defective copies of a determinate standard. Their imperfection arises from the necessary inadequation that must exist between an indeterminate and in exhaustible urge and any concrete and determinate articulation of justice. This re lationship of inadequacy between culture and value is what we mean by "tran scendence." The goal of transcendental deconstruction is to rediscover this transcendence where it has been forgotten.
In fact, Balkin surprisingly insists that transcendental deconstruc tion saves us from nihilism, that persistent modernist hobgoblin. In
Balkin's own words, "[A] transcendental approach to deconstruction
[is] the only approach that can rescue deconstruction from the nihilistic abyss of infinite meaning." 138 Balkin reasons that the transcendental reach into the wellsprings of the human soul is necessary for social cri tique. Critique, he claims, cannot be immanent; it cannot arise from within culture itself.
[T]o say that positive norms are inadequate -and hence in order to deconstruct them -we must refer to values that lie beyond the norms we are critiquing and that serve as the source of our criticism, even if we believe that the values we wish to uphold are to some extent realized in our culture. Suppose that we denied that we need concern ourselves with transcendental values: Suppose we assert that we are only interested in engaging in an "immanent" critique. In other words, we say that we are using one aspect of our cultural norms to critique other aspects, and therefore we need make no reference to anything beyond the positive norms of our culture. For example, we might use the commitment to equality expressed in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to criticize the lack of civil rights for homosexuals in the United States. The question remains, however, why we saw a particular aspect of our cultural practices as a worthy basis for our critique and another aspect as unworthy. Since both are equally aspects of our culture, culture by itself cannot serve as a norm to decide between them.139
Balkin admits that one might nonetheless insist that we can use one aspect of our culture to critique other aspects. Balkin argues, how ever, that to do so we must allow one element of our culture to take precedence over another merely because it predominates quant i tatively throughout society. I agree with Balkin's rejection of this rather nonradical form of critique, which would do nothing more than con servatively reinforce the status quo.140 But Balkin then claims that in or der to explain how we are enabled to critique our own cultural norms, we must turn to "transcendent norms of justice." To Balkin, there is no other way to attain a critical viewpoint. Again, he maintains that these norms transcend culture: "Although we may fi nd these norms partially realized in portions of our own culture, these inadequate articulations Balkin's argument suggests that either the individual stands prior to and above culture or the individual becomes a culturally programm ed automaton. Faced with this choice, Balkin of course insists that the in dividual must stand prior to and above culture; otherwise, the concept of personal responsibility becomes moot. By thus separating the indi vidual subject from the cultural (external) world, Balkin reenacts mod ernist metaphysics -which postmodern interpretivism of course re jects. This metaphysical return to modernism pushes Balkin along toward other errors, as hermetic modernist lines and categories begin to appear. For instance, I agree when Balkin argues that deconstruction can be understood, in part, as a method, but in his hands, deconstruc tion appears to become no more than a method -a method to be used by responsible neo-liberal individuals as they pursue certain goals or values, such as justice.143 Hence, Balkin suggests that deconstruction and justice are radically distinct. Indeed, he calls his own article an "encounter between deconstruction and justice,"144 which resembles an "encounter between two parties."145 He envisions justice as a human value and drive, while deconstruction becomes a method that merely helps us pursue our sense of justice. Balkin, in fact, has it exactly backward.
C. On Justice
Postmodern interpretivism can explain how we come to understand justice as a value and as an inexhaustible drive. Although not a neat di vision, philosophical hermeneutics contributes more to our understand ing of justice as a value, while deconstruction contributes more to our understanding of the urge for justice. From a Gadamerian viewpoint, justice is a contested concept within our communal traditions. As with any concept, we open to the meaning of justice, not because our souls transcend culture, but rather because we participate in our communal traditions an.d culture. Contrary to Balkin's suggestion, oilr sense of jus tice does not come from outside our own cultural context or horizon, but from within it. The ontological quality of our being-in-the-world does not undermine justice or eliminate responsibility to others. Instead, the meanings of justice and responsibility come into being exactly be cause of our being-in-the-world. 147
In short, our sense or meaning of justice is socially produced. Con sequently, from this perspective, Balkin's argument immediately goes awry when he designates the human soul as the origin or wellspring for our sense of and urge for justice. By positing a precultural human soul, Balkin ignores one of the central messages of postmodern interpretiv ism: that we can never be outside of our own horizon. We always and already stand within our communal traditions or culture. There is no outside. Even if we are born with some precultural drives or valuessuch as justice -our being-in-the-world is so culturally saturated that a search for a precultural pearl buried somewhere beneath the cultural 146. For a collection of some of Kant's most important writings, see lMMANuEL KANT. KA.NT SELECTIONS (Theodore M. Greene ed., 1929).
147. Hence, Balkin appears to contradict the thrust of his argument when he writes that "culture and language do not efface human autonomy but are the conditions of its very possibility." Balkin, supra note 7, at 1186. waves seems at best irrelevant and at worst nonsensical. We should fo cus not on a futile search for pristine pearls, but rather on understanding the social and cultural construction of communication, values, and so cial reality. 14 8
Besides explaining how we come to have a sense or value of jus tice, philosophical hermeneutics also helps us to understand our inex haustible urge for justice -that is, the impatient movement of our sense of justice. As already stated, justice is a contested concept within our communal traditions. If truth keeps happening, as philosophical her meneutics maintains, then the truth or meaning of justice keeps happen ing. The meaning of justice cannot be exhausted; it moves with our shifting horizons as we enter into ever-new contexts. 149 Moreover, our inexhaustible drive for justice is linked to the movement of tradition. As previously discussed, even our traditions are constantly being trans formed. Traditions are neither fixed and precisely bounded entities nor are they passed on to individuals through some precise method or mechanical process. The boundaries of any tradition are always con tested, always constituted and reconstituted, and this constant reconsti tution always is simultaneously constructive and destructive. Thus, while the concept of a tradition helps us to grasp or understand the so cial construction of reality -our being-in-the-world -we should not attempt to reify or reduce any actual tradition (or even the concept of a 148. Balkin's turn to precultural human drives and values is especially surprising given that he apparently has accepted the postmodernist emphasis on culture and tradi tion in his other writings. For example, in another recent article, he notes:
A jurisprudence of the subject is above all a cultural jurisprudence, for it is cul ture that creates legal subjects as subjects ...• The beholder [or subject] is not fully in control of what she sees; she is part of a larger legal and political culture that shapes the very forms of her under standing. She does not choose the terms of her ideology or social construction. Rather she chooses through them; they form the framework within which her choices are understood and made.
Balkin, Understanding, supra note 36, at 108. Balkin's unexpected transition, however, is not unprecedented in critical theory. In a somewhat similar transformation, Max Horkheimer moved from a critique of ideology to a struggle for a "theological mo ment" in philosophy that emphasized a human longing to transcend reality. See DA YID HELD, INTRODUCTION TO CRrr! CAL THEORY: HORKHEIMER TO HABERMAS 198 (1980 , 1978) . To me, justice is a sociological phenomenon, not merely a philosophical question.
152. The social theorist Niklas Luhmann, in articulating the autopoietic theory of law, explains that a legal system must have a binary code -justice versus injusticeand must exclude both contradictions -justice is injustice, or injustice is justice. See Niklas Luhmann, Law as a Social System, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 136, 140 (Shierry Weber Nicholsen trans.) (1989) . From this viewpoint, then, one can easily understand why so many legal scholars consider deconstruction so threatening to a legal system. The con cept of a legal system, at least as described by Luhmann, is destabilized by the decon structive notion that justice always contains injustice.
153. Cf. Stanley Fish, Play of Surfaces: Theory and the Law, in LEGAL HERME NEUTICS: HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE, supra note 39, at 297, 305-06 (observ ing that every horizon of understanding is itself an engine of change).
work. "154 Balkin's conception of the soul gives us nothing that, in our being-in-the-world, we do not already have -an insatiable urge for justice. Ye t, in return for his transcendental effort, Balkin suffers a sig nificant political cost. By positing the human soul as the source of our sense of and urge for justice, Balkin obscures a radical political point -that humans have a propensity to perpetrate at least as much injus tice as justice. In fact, I could argue (but I will not) that human history -the Holocaust, slavery, the Inquisition, Jim Crow -demonstrates an inexhaustible drive for cruelty and indifference. In this light, Balkin's human soul appears just a bit too noble and cheerful.
Perhaps Balkin's modernist metaphysical twist, which induced him to separate sharply deconstruction from justice, led him to overlook the hermeneutic and sociological significance of deconstruction. Indeed, in Force of Law, Derrida stated that " [ d]econstruction is justice." iss While I would not absolutely equate deconstruction and justice, I do insist that they are inseparable -or that they should be so. In particular, the deconstructive focus on the Other ought to be a central aspect of justice.
The insatiable drive to reveal violence and deception, to uncover denial, exclusion, and oppression, should remain at the forefront of justice. In stead of contemplating and pursuing an affirm ative vision of justice, we should focus on what might be called deconjustice -an endless effort to eradicate injustice.156 Consequently, I would modify Balkin's concep tion of the virtuous person. In Balkin's eyes:
To be just we must construct examples of justice using the indetenninate urge for justice as our goad rather than as our guide. This means that the virtuous person is not a good copyist but a good architect. She attempts to satisfy her sense of justice by constructing just institutions.157 154. NORRIS. supra note 5, at 200 (emphasis omitted). 155. Derrida, Law, supra note 3, at 945 (emphasis added). Elsewhere, Derrida writes: "[D]econstructions have always represented, as I see it, the at least necessary condition for identifying and combating the totalitarian risk." Derrida, Sound of the Sea, supra note 119, at 647. 156. Cf. WHITE, supra note 116, at 122-23 (recommending reversal of the justice injustice priority so that we fo cus on injustice); Allan C. Hutchinson, Doing the Right Thing? Toward a Postmodern Politics, 26 LAW & SoCY. REv. 773 (1992) (noting that postmodemism is an effective theoretical resource for radical transformative politics); Thurschwell, supra note 150, at 330-32 (claiming that deconstruction is a call to abso lute justice, to uncover the violence of law). Drucilla Cornell states:
[T]he entire project of the philosophy of the limit [or deconstruction] is driven by an ethical desire to enact the ethical relation. Again, by the ethical relation I mean to indicate the aspiration to a nonviolent relationship to the Other, and to otherness more generally, that assumes responsibility to guard the Other against the appropriation that would deny her difference and singularity.
DRUCILLA CORNELL, THE PHlLoSOPHY OF THE LIMIT 62 (1992). 157. Balkin, supra note 7, at 1141 (emphasis added).
To me, the virtuous person focuses less on the construction of just insti tutions than on the deconstruction of unjust ones. The virtuous person, in other words, primarily pursues deconjustice, for the diminution of in justice will produce increasingly just institutions. 15 8
Ultimately, however, the intimate connection of deconstruction and justice ends in paradox, not in a determinate relation. 15 9 Deconstruction underscores that the Other always lies in the margin -some individu als and groups always are excluded and denied. Thus, deconstruction challenges us to justify this violence and oppression or to change. foundations, yet it nonetheless remains markedly political.
158. Before anyone started talking about deconstruction, Edmond N. Cahn wrote that justice "means the active process of remedying or preventing what would arouse the sense of injustice." EDMOND N. CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE 13-14 (1949) (emphasis omitted). Cahn, however, considers this sense of injustice to be a natural ca pacity or predisposition of the human animal. See id. at 24-25. In this regard, then, Cahn's argument resembles Balkin's emphasis on the wellsprings of the human soul.
159. Cf. Feldman, Diagnosing Power, supra note 5, at 1082-83 (noting that postmodemism revels in paradoxes).
160. I agree with Balkin on this point. See Balkin, supra note 7, at 1162-64; ac cord WIDTE, supra note 116, at 125-42. As Balkin observes: "Justice, it seems, does not always demand that one speak in the language of the Other, especially when the Other is not playing by the same rules." Balkin, supra note 7, at 1164. 161. In the words of Stephen K. White: The delight with the appearance of the other brings with it the urge to draw it closer. But that urge must realize its limits, beyond which the drawing nearer be comes a gesture of grasping. And that realization will be palpable only when we are sensitive to the appearance of the particular other as testimony of finitude. Then delight will be paired with a sense of grief or mourning at the fragility and momentary quality of the appearance of the other. WIDTE, supra note 116, at 90.
